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Governance networks are both nested and interconnected systems. Identifying internal 
 boundaries within governance networks, such as those governance structures that influence and 
are influenced by large and diverse watersheds such as the Lake Champlain Basin, is  necessary 
for differentiating between multiple functional subnetworks. Internal network boundaries exist 
between functional subnetworks when the networks have divergent structures (Weible &  Sabatier, 
2005). A qualitative case study of Lake Champlain Basin watershed governance  networks identi-
fied several key overlapping subnetworks in which organizations interact in a variety of ways 
(Koliba, Reynolds, Zia, & Scheinert, 2015). An online survey of institutional actors was used to 
identify which actors were connected in five different functional subnetworks. Structural com-
parisons are made by analyzing the correlation between the subnetworks based on the quadratic 
assignment procedure (QAP) and network macrostructure. Results show that the information 
sharing, technical assistance, and project collaboration subnetworks formed one grouping, while 
the reporting and financial resource sharing subnetworks formed another  grouping. The results 
demonstrated that this triangulated comparison was necessary to reach valid conclusions on the 
structural variation between the subnetworks on a multiplex network when subnetworks were 
structurally similar.
Keywords: multiplex networks, network boundaries, governance networks
Boundaries define the space of operations for actors in a complex system and influence 
the shifting coalitions that can exist within the system. Koliba, Meek, and Zia (2010) ex-
plain the importance of boundaries within governance networks, finding that, “Internal 
boundaries will likely be influenced by the nature of the multiplex ties formed between 
actors in the network” (p. 169). Multiplex ties are network ties that encode multiple types 
of interaction within a single network tie. Coding multiple meanings in a single multi-
plex tie renders  reliable interpretation of analysis based on multiplex ties problematic 
(Butts, 2008, 2009). Disaggregating multiplex ties into their separate meanings generates 
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functional subnetworks, where all of the ties in each subnetwork encode only one type 
of  interaction. Internal boundaries may exist between functional subnetworks when 
those subnetworks have different structures (Weible & Sabatier, 2005). The location 
of internal boundaries determines which functional subnetworks should be analyzed 
as a single network or analyzed individually. The presence and location of boundaries 
also influences how managers can ensure that services are delivered and policies are 
implemented (Provan & Lemaire, 2012). Structural analysis of the functional sub-
networks of a governance network will reveal where boundaries exist between those 
functional subnetworks.
Identifying a network’s internal boundaries is not the same as identifying its ex-
ternal boundaries. Approaches for defining external network boundaries can identify the 
outer boundary, the “network boundary,” as seen in Figure 1 (Butts, 2008, 2009; Lauman, 
 Marsden, & Prensky, 1989). The external boundaries of the multiplex network also define 
the external boundaries of the subnetworks; every node that is included in any subnet-
work is included in the multiplex network and all of the other subnetworks. Since external 
bounding approaches can only set this external boundary, a different approach is needed 
to identify internal boundaries.
Weible and Sabatier (2005) offer a method for documenting the existence of bound-
aries within specific systems. They use a method of structural comparison, based in the 
argument that the subnetworks with the most similar structures are the most closely related 
ones. Figure 1 depicts three structurally different subnetworks, and shows where boundar-
ies exist between them. Any structurally similar networks depicted would lack a boundary 
between them.
Figure 1. Network concept definitions in context
62194-15-25.indd   66 18/08/15   10:30 AM
 S. Scheinert et al. / The Shape of Watershed Governance 67
1. Boundaries within Networked Systems
A thorough structural analysis of a multiplex governance network can reveal the 
 internal boundaries between the functional subnetworks of a governance network.  However, 
research findings indicate that, in a multiplex network, the existence of a tie between two 
nodes in one subnetwork increases the likelihood that a tie will exist between those same 
two nodes in the other subnetworks (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Weible & Sabatier, 
2005), indicating that the subnetworks’ dyadic structures will be highly  correlated. For the 
purpose of placing internal boundaries, this expected correlation prevents from even qua-
dratic assignment procedure (QAP), which Weible and Sabatier (2005)  apply as their sole 
analysis for structural comparison, from demonstrating sufficiently strong conclusions 
about structural variation. Instead, for identifying internal boundaries, a more  extensive 
structural analysis is needed to identify smaller, consistent structural variations. We exam-
ine this hypothesis through a case study of the empirical watershed governance networks 
that are present in portions of the Lake Champlain Basin.
1.1. Networks in Watershed Governance and Climate Change Policy
A major theme in the studies on governance networks is about how these networks 
can and should be managed (Klijn, Steijn, & Edelenbos, 2010; McGuire, 2002). These 
studies often focus on two issues: the role of trust between the actors in a network and 
how that trust can be built (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn, 2010; 
Klijn & Skelcher, 2007; Sorenson & Torfing, 2005, 2009) and the impact of network 
structure and design on network outputs (Agranoff, 2004; Provan & Kenis, 2008; Provan & 
Lemaire, 2012; Provan & Milward, 2001). In this literature, the governance network is 
treated largely as a proverbial “black box.” Instead of linking differing structures to differ-
ing management strategies, universal approaches are promoted. Managers are  instructed 
to use certain behaviors (Milward & Provan, 2006) or to build the networks with a certain 
network structure or pattern of relationships (Provan & Milward, 2001), to seek a mini-
mum network density (Hirschi, 2010), or to manage through a certain type of organiza-
tion, such as a governmental program or non-governmental organization (NGO) (Provan & 
Kenis, 2008). Further studies are needed regarding the structures that existing  governance 
networks and their subnetworks take, and what implications those structures have for 
 policy making and service delivery.
Where the general governance network literature tends to examine conceptual or 
theoretical networks, the literature on watershed governance networks is able to examine 
specific governance networks (Imperial, 2005; Schneider, Scholz, Lubell, Mindruta, & 
Edwardsen, 2003; Weible & Sabatier, 2005). The research on watershed networks includes 
a wide body of literature on the benefits and requirements of cooperation and coordination 
in networks (Hirschi, 2010; Imperial, 2005; Jost & Jacob, 2004; Lubell & Fulton, 2008; 
Schneider et al., 2003; Scholz, Berardo, & Kile, 2008; Weible & Sabatier, 2005), planning 
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(Dutcher & Blythe, 2012; Koontz & Johnson, 2004; Lienert, Schnetzer, & Ingold, 2013), 
knowledge diffusion and learning (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Cash et al., 2003; Newig, 
Guenther, & Pahl-Wostl, 2010; Vignola, McDaniels, & Scholz, 2013), and system scaling 
(Cohen & Davidson, 2011; Norman & Bakker, 2009; Vignola et al., 2013), all of which 
are harnessed to build theories that apply to all governance networks. What the watershed 
governance literature continues to miss is a focus on implementation networks and the 
network reactions to policy decisions (Rykkja, Neby, & Hope, 2014).
1.2. The Role of Functional Ties in Forming Internal Boundaries
Butts (2009) determines that rigorous network analysis can only rest on networks 
that use a clear and consistent definition of what the included ties represent. These tie 
types each define a separate functional subnetwork within the multiplex network. In a 
 rigorous analysis, separate subnetworks must be analyzed independently. The subnet-
works in Figure 1, for example, arise as separate networks for analysis, each with its own 
unique type of interaction and pattern of network ties. Examples of different types of ties 
in an institutional network include sharing information, providing reports, and collaborat-
ing on projects.
The effectiveness of any network relies on its actors properly matching their strate-
gies and structures to the network’s environment, and dyadic and governance arrangements 
(Baltazar & Brooks, 2007; Koliba et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2012; Provan & Lemaire, 2012; 
Provan & Milward, 2001) and of forming an accurate situational awareness through coor-
dination and collaboration (Hutchins, 1995; Luokkala & Virranttaus, 2014; Van de Walle & 
Turoff, 2008). Each instance of a network environment, structure, and governance arrange-
ment generates a new and different operational environment. Baltazar and Brooks (2007) 
interpret this variation across operational environments as the formation of boundaries 
between systems, with organizations requiring different strategies for different environ-
ments. Since each subnetwork with a different structure is potentially a different operational 
environment, a method is needed to determine which subnetworks do represent different 
environments.
1.3. Methods for Defining External Network Boundaries
Finding the proper approach to define the external boundaries of a network is one 
of the most persistent challenges to any empirical network study (Butts, 2008, 2009). 
A wealth of literature examines the procedures researchers can apply to pre-determine 
external network boundaries. Two methods dominate this literature. The first is a “deduc-
tive approach,” where the researcher defines a class of nodes that will be included in the 
study’s network and then identifies the actors that fit this definition. Examples include the 
individuals of a social network (Lienert et al., 2013), the words of a semantic network 
(Diesner & Carley, 2011), or the organizations of an institutional network (Comfort, Oh, 
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Ertan, & Scheinert, 2010; Koliba et al., 2010). While there are many ways to define a 
target group of nodes for inclusion, the key aspect of the deductive approach is that the 
researcher determines the complete list of included nodes in the network prior to collect-
ing data on network ties (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Jost & Jacob, 2004; Lubell & Fulton, 
2008; Vignola et al., 2013). The second approach is “inductive,” where a set of documents 
or a small group of informants is selected and the actors mentioned in the documents 
or by the informants are included in the network (Comfort et al., 2010; Johnson, 1990; 
Pustejovsky &  Spillane, 2009; Scheinert & Comfort, 2014). The deductive method is gen-
erally used when boundaries are easily defined and membership in either the node class 
or network is easily determined. The inductive method is used when boundaries cannot be 
defined or are unknown in advance.
1.4. Structural Analysis for Locating Internal Network Boundaries
The most relevant literature on the definition and role of internal network bound-
aries focuses on the identification of communities in networks (Duch & Arenas, 2005; 
Fortunato, 2010). Subgroup detection, including clique analysis (Burt, 1978), Newman’s 
grouping algorithms (Newman, 2006), structural equivalence (Burt, 1987; Sailer, 1978), 
and fuzzy overlapping groups (Davis & Carley, 2008; Gregory, 2011), among many other 
methods, identifies nodes that fit in certain groups. The difference between these methods 
is that subgroup detection uses a network’s structure to carve that network into subgroups 
while the external boundaries approaches define the size of the network.
Weible and Sabatier (2005) offer the strongest example of how to build a struc-
tural comparison of institutional networks. They compare the structures of groupings of 
organizations within the subnetworks of a multiplex network for setting policy regard-
ing marine protected areas. They define network links as Allies, Coordination, Advice/
Information, and shared beliefs regarding a specific policy, the California Marine Life 
Protection Act, networks. They compare the position of existent dyads with a correla-
tional analysis using quadratic assignment procedure (QAP). QAP correlation analysis 
provides a general indicator of when a tie between two given nodes in one network is 
likely to indicate a tie between those same two nodes in another network. This is a pow-
erful process for comparing subnetworks, but it is not the only one that can and should 
be considered. Subtle differences in tie locations can lead to meaningful differences in 
network structure; changing just a few ties can be the difference between a lattice network 
and a small world network (Telesford, Joyce, Hayasaka, Burdette, & Laurienti, 2011; 
Watts & Strogatz, 1998), which is a small enough difference that it might not reflect in 
QAP correlation results. Additional, supporting results are needed to augment the QAP 
correlation results.
The network analyst must seek results through the triangulation of descriptive an-
alytic techniques whose combined results yield an overall conclusion. To address this 
need for consistency across a range of results, in this study we applied several analyses 
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of the subnetworks’ structures to identify consistent and inconsistent structure: subnet-
work  dyadic correlations and subnetwork macrostructures. Internal boundaries will exist 
between subnetworks with different structures and not exist between subnetworks with 
similar structures. Since networks may take many different forms, it is more important to 
identify consistencies across a set of subnetworks. The results will support the placement 
of internal boundaries when measurements are differ across subnetworks.
Subnetwork dyadic correlation. In this study we applied QAP correlation analysis, as 
used by Weible and Sabatier (2005). When a high correlation exists between two net-
works, coded as matrices, there is a greater likelihood that the presence of a tie in one 
network accurately predicts the presence or absence of a tie between the same two nodes 
in the other network. High positive correlations indicate similar patterns of observed and 
unobserved ties while negative correlations indicate an opposite pattern of structural holes 
and ties. Similar networks will share high, positive correlation coefficients.
Subnetwork macrostructures Network macrostructural analyses include small world 
networks (Watts & Strogatz, 1998), scale free networks (Barabasi & Albert, 1999), and 
core-periphery networks (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The public administration literature 
does not yet regularly apply network macrostructural concepts for describing and analyz-
ing governance networks. Each macrostructural analysis defines a theoretical structure 
that networks can take, including identifying a test for determining if a given network fits 
that definition. This study identifies small world networks using the coefficient proposed 
by Telesford et al. (2011):
 w = 
Lrand
L
 − 
C
Clatt
 (1)
where L is the observed average path length, C is the observed clustering coefficient, 
Lrand is the average path length of a random network, and Clatt is the clustering coefficient 
of a lattice network. Small world networks produce a coefficient at or near zero. In a 
scale free network, the distribution of degree centrality scores, which count the number 
of ties that each nodes has (Wasserman & Faust, 1994), takes the form of a power-law 
distribution when plotted in a histogram. Core-periphery networks can be determined in 
UCINet (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002), which provides an algorithm that identi-
fies core membership and indicates how closely the network matches a core-periphery 
structure (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013). UCINet’s categorical core-periphery 
 algorithm  operates similarly to block modeling approaches, identifying and sorting nodes 
into two blocks (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). The variation patterns found in 
macro- structural analyses augment dyadic correlation results. Similar small world coef-
ficient values, histogram shapes, and core-periphery correlations and core membership 
are used to determine the location of internal boundaries. If these results can corroborate 
the results of the QAP analysis, then both sets of results will indicate the location of an 
internal boundary.
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2. Method
2.1. Case Study Focus
The Lake Champlain Basin (LCB) was chosen as a case study for its large and estab-
lished  watershed governance network (Osherenko, 2014). Lake Champlain is a large, fresh-
water lake that sits astride the borders between Vermont and New York in the United States 
and Quebec, Canada. The basin is the site of farming communities, particularly in Vermont 
and Quebec, and has struggled to meet its water quality requirements under the Clean  Water 
Act. The  arrangements made to govern the LCB and its sub-basins (Dutcher & Blythe, 2012; 
 Osherenko, 2014) require interaction and collaboration across state and national borders in 
order to expand governance structures throughout the watershed. Vermont, with limited state 
budgets and producing the largest share of pollution, particularly from non-point sources (Lake 
Champlain Basin Program [LCBP], 2012; Osherenko, 2014), has relied on public-private part-
nerships for pursuing its water quality goals. This reliance has generated a large and engaged 
network of stakeholders. The extensive history of multi-stakeholder interactions related to 
 water quality in the Vermont section of the LCB makes it an effective case study for examining 
the structures of a mature governance network and for demonstrating a method of identifying 
the boundaries between the functional subnetworks of a multiplex governance network.
2.2. Data
Our research used network surveys to acquire data regarding watershed-scale gover-
nance in the Lake Champlain Basin. As part of their work, Koliba, Reynolds, et al. (2015) 
used an inductive approach to define network boundaries (Comfort et al., 2010; Schein-
ert & Comfort, 2014), where water resource management documents are used to identify 
a wide swath of organizations that play a role pertaining to water quality outcomes in the 
Lake Champlain Basin. The current study approaches a targeted set of representatives from 
these organizations with an online survey that recorded interactions between organizations 
with a focus on two LCB sub-basins: the Winooski River watershed and the Missisquoi 
River watershed. These watersheds represent Vermont’s primary region of development 
and one of Vermont’s two primary agricultural environments, respectively. Land uses in 
these watersheds contribute to the two leading sources of non-point source pollution in 
Vermont into the LCB, urban stormwater runoff and agricultural runoff (LCBP, 2012).
We designed this study’s survey as a whole population survey, rather than a sample-
based survey. We established an initial alter roster, based on the organizational list that 
 Koliba, Reynolds, et al. (2015) found. We augmented this list through a range of stake-
holder interactions between July, 2012 and May, 2014, including eighteen stakeholder in-
terviews, four focus groups, and two large-scale mediated modeling workshops. The focus 
groups included approximately two dozen different individual stakeholders representing 
nearly the same number of organizations while more than 100 stakeholders attended each 
mediated modeling workshop. This process produced a list of 187 organizations, including 
NGOs, governmental programs at both the state and federal level, regional and municipal 
62194-15-25.indd   71 18/08/15   10:30 AM
72 S. Scheinert et al. / The Shape of Watershed Governance 
governing entities, and private businesses, along with five collective groups which con-
tain organizations that could not be reached for response.1 We then reviewed this list in 
consultation with stakeholders to ensure consistency, accuracy, and completeness. During 
stakeholder consultations, we identified five key types of interaction between organizations: 
Information Sharing, Technical Assistance Provision, Reporting,2 Financial Resource Shar-
ing, and Project Coordination and Collaboration. Researchers identified and approached 
specified representatives from each organization through email, phone, and in-person con-
tact to recruit participants. Each survey participant was presented with a list of all the other 
organizations in the network and asked to indicate whether they interact with that organiza-
tion “frequently,” “infrequently,” or not at all for all five different types of interactions. 
To account for the limits in identifying the initial list of organizations in a network 
survey, which Marsden (2005) discussed, we asked respondents to identify organizations 
that were not included in the original sample. Requests for additional organizations in-
creased the total number to 198 organizations that could be contacted and to a total set of 
204 potential alter organizations, including those groups of organizations that could not 
be reached for a response. As respondents suggested additions, these new additions were 
added to the survey’s alter rosters and contacted to participate. This method combines the 
benefits of a pre-determined alter list with the benefits of snowball sampling for estab-
lishing an externally bounded governance network (Marsden, 2005; Scott, 1991). To aid 
respondents in addressing this extensive list of potential alters the list was divided into four 
groupings based on organizational type and geographic field of operation. These groupings 
were Governmental Programs, Regional Actors and NGOs, Organizations with interests in 
the Winooski Watershed, and Organizations with interests in the Missisquoi Watershed. We 
initially asked respondents if their organization interacted with any members of a grouping. 
If a respondent indicated that their organization did not, then the respondent was not asked 
about interactions with the members of that group. Table 1 contains the survey response 
rates by grouping. Responses provided the data to generate five separate subnetworks, each 
representing one type of interaction and a sixth network that is the mathematical union of 
the five subnetworks and representing the full multiplex watershed governance network in 
both the Winooski and Missisquoi watersheds of the Lake Champlain Basin.
Network data are sensitive to missing data (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). To minimize 
the error introduced by these missing data, we binarized and symmetrized the network 
matrices.3 Once binarized and symmetrized, the representative of only one organization in 
the dyad must indicate that the link exists for the link to be included in the network, pro-
viding two possible observations of each link. Following binarization and symmetrization, 
the only part of the network that remains unobserved are the dyads that include any two 
1 Collective groups were used to record interactions with large, medium, and small farms in each the survey’s 
targeted watersheds and a catch-all organization for interactions with Vermont’s Agency of Agricultural, Farms, 
and Markets (VTAAFM) that were not covered by the named VTAAFM programs included in the survey.
2 For determining reporting structure, the network was designated as the respondent’s “Report to” network and 
framed as a respondent’s “direct reports.”
3 Binarization and symmetrization were performed such such that: Aij = Aji = Max(Aij, Aji), where A is the 
 adjacency matrix and Aij and Aji are the related cells of the adjacency matrix. Aij = Aji = Max(Aij, Aji)
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nodes both of which did not respond. The observed percentage of the network is reported 
in Table 1’s Observation Rate column.4 Low observation rates for certain groups would 
undermine confidence if the analysis only used data from the members of those groups. 
Since the analysis always uses the full organization list the high observation rate for the 
complete network gives confidence in accuracy of the analytic results.
3. Network Analysis Results5
The following results indicate where boundaries fall between the functional 
 subnetworks within the multiplex governance network for the Lake Champlain Basin. 
The  results show two sets of substantially similar subnetworks. The variation in results is 
 subtle, but present. These results suggest that internal boundaries separate two groups of 
subnetworks. One group contains the reporting and financial resource sharing subnetworks 
while the other group contains the information sharing, technical assistance  provision, and 
project coordination and collaboration subnetworks.
3.1. Subnetwork Dyadic Correlation
The results from the QAP correlation analysis (Table 2) confirm the necessity of 
running additional analyses. The subnetworks are all highly correlated, preventing firm 
conclusions about structural differences. Nevertheless, there is a pattern in the results that 
4 Observation Rate is obtained using the number of organizations that completed responses in each organiza-
tional group in the network such that:
 Density = 1 − 
# Unobserved Dyads
Total Dyads
 (2)
 Density = 1 − 
(NRN)(NRN−1)
(N)(N−1)
 (3)
where NRN stands for the number of non-responding nodes and N stands for the total number of nodes. In the 
second, more specific version of this formula, both the numerator and denominator should be divided by 2, to 
account for the non-directionality introduced by symmetrization. Since both terms are divided by 2, this step 
becomes a multiplicative identity and so is omitted.
5 This study uses two different network analysis programs: *ORA (Carley, 2001–2011) and UCINet (Borgatti, 
Everett, and Freeman, 2002). A note with each result will indicate which program was used to obtain that result.
Table 1
Network survey response rates by organizational grouping
Organizational Group
Number of 
Contacts
Completed 
Responses
Response 
Rate (%)
Observation 
Rate (%)
Governmental Programs  56 26 46.4 71.75
Regional Actors and NGOs  50 26 52.0 73.47
Winooski Watershed  52 11 21.2 38.16
Missisquoi Watershed  40 12 30.0 51.54
Total 198 75 37.9 60.26
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Table 2
QAP correlation matrix
Reporting 
Project 
Coordination
Financial 
Resources
Information 
Sharing
Technical 
Assistance
Multiplex 
Network
Reporting 1
Sig. –
Project Coordination 0.618 1
Sig. (0.000) –
Financial Resources 0.700 0.719 1
Sig. (0.000) (0.000) –
Information Sharing 0.542 0.735 0.595 1
Sig. (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) –
Technical Assistance 0.602 0.788 0.670 0.765 1
Sig. (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) –
Union 0.526 0.760 0.586 0.940 0.809 1
Sig. (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) –
provides some guidance on where internal boundaries may lie. The weakest correlation 
coefficients are in the relationships where either the reporting or financial resource shar-
ing subnetworks are compared with either the information sharing, technical assistance, 
or coordination subnetworks. The reporting and financial resource sharing subnetworks 
are relatively highly correlated, as are any pairings of the information sharing, project 
coordination, and technical assistance subnetworks. This pattern suggests that this system 
has two separate sets of related functional subnetworks. One set includes the information 
sharing, coordination and collaboration, and technical assistance subnetworks. The second 
set includes the reporting and financial resource sharing subnetworks. The correlation co-
efficients are all high, and high correlations prevents firm conclusions about the placement 
of boundaries and supports the conclusion that observing a tie in one network increases 
the likelihood of observing that same tie in the other subnetworks (Provan Fish, & Sydow, 
2007; Weible & Sabatier, 2005).
3.2. Subnetwork Macrostructures
Figure 2 contains the histograms that can be used to determine if each functional 
subnetwork is a scale free network. All five subnetworks and the union network fit the 
definition of a scale free network, displaying a power law distribution for their central-
ity scores. The reporting subnetwork fits a consistent and unambiguous power law; each 
successive step in the graph is lower than the preceding step until the graph tails off with 
single nodes marking the highest levels. The graphs for information sharing, coordina-
tion, technical assistance, and for the union network contain a consistent complicating 
 characteristic. In each, a secondary hump emerges at around 40% of the total possible ties. 
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Figure 2. Scale free network analysis: Histograms of normalized degree centrality in all subnetworks
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This pattern is clearest in the information sharing network and least clear in the coordina-
tion network but remains present. The financial resource sharing subnetwork has a similar 
small hump, though it is at a lower centrality score, about 20%. This pattern of differences 
supports linking the information sharing, technical assistance, and coordination subnet-
works, while not supporting the links between the reporting and financial resource sharing 
subnetworks that emerged in the QAP analysis. The results for the small world network 
analysis ( Table 3) show the clearest divides of any analysis yet, suggesting three group-
ings. In this case, the information sharing and union networks stand out from both the 
grouping of the technical assistance and coordination subnetworks and the group of the 
reporting and financial resource sharing subnetworks. All subnetworks can likely be con-
sidered as small world networks. While Telesford et al. (2011) suggest a range of -0.5 , ω 
, 0.5 on a scale between 21 and 1, while allowing for variation in the range in different 
network contexts. This suggested range would likely make a value of 0.3, as observed for 
the reporting and financial resource sharing subnetworks, a borderline result. With positive 
coefficients of less than 0.2, the information sharing, technical assistance, and coordina-
tion subnetworks are small world networks.
The results of the core-periphery analysis (Table 4) suggest similar internal bound-
ary locations and begin to offer some basis for why the reporting and financial resource 
sharing subnetworks differ from the other subnetworks. Though all of the subnetworks 
are core-periphery networks, the reporting and financial resource sharing subnetworks 
do not correlate as highly with a theoretical core-periphery network as do the other three 
Table 3
Small world coefficient calculation (UCINet)
Reporting
Project 
Coordination
Information 
Sharing
Financial 
Resource 
Sharing
Technical 
Assistance
Multiplex 
Network
Node Count 204 204 204 204 204 204
Density 0.041 0.080 0.117 0.050 0.090 0.130
Average Degree 8.10 16.19 23.74 9.94 18.19 26.47
Clustering Coefficient6 0.606 0.581 0.611 0.603 0.566 0.614
Average Distance 2.196 2.112 1.985 2.133 2.068 1.954
Clustering Coefficient 
(Lattice)
0.643 0.700 0.717 0.667 0.706 0.720
Ave. Distance
(Erdos-Renyi)
2.738 2.171 1.936 2.538 2.088 1.899
Clustering Ratio (Lattice) 0.94 0.83 0.85 0.90 0.80 0.85
Distance Ratio 1.25 1.03 0.98 1.19 1.01 0.97
Telesford Small World 
Coefficient
0.30 0.20 0.12 0.29 0.21 0.12
6 Though the definition of the clustering coefficient is consistent across UCINet and *ORA, the two programs 
consistently produce different values for this measure. All comparisons of the value are made using a consis-
tent program to avoid potentially erroneous conclusions being made as a result of comparing differently scaled 
results. Small world coefficients were calculated using clustering coefficients calculated in UCINet.
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subnetworks. The reporting and financial resource sharing subnetworks also have the larg-
est number of government agencies in their cores, calculated as a percentage of the nodes 
in their core, showing that the cores for the reporting and financial resource sharing subnet-
works differ, in a similar, substantive, way, from the cores of the other three subnetworks.
4. Empirically-Identified Network Boundaries
As was expected due to the influence that presence of ties in one subnetwork has 
across other subnetworks (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007; Weible & Sabatier, 2005), these 
subnetworks are substantially similar, showing high correlation coefficients between all 
five subnetworks. We can confirm that ties of different types are highly correlated. We can 
also conclude that our additional structural analyses are necessary to find internal bound-
aries within governance networks.
The results of this thorough structural analysis indicate that internal boundaries do 
exist between the functional subnetworks of the water quality governance network in the 
Lake Champlain Basin. Similar to how a factor analysis in statistics allows for viewing 
different variables as contributing to the same underlying conceptual factors, our analysis 
allows for viewing certain functional network ties as part of the same underlying subnetworks. 
In this governance network, the reporting and financial resource sharing subnetworks show 
quantitative differences from the information sharing, technical assistance, and project co-
ordination and collaboration subnetworks. The QAP correlation coefficients between the 
members of these two groupings of subnetworks are higher than those between subnet-
works in different groupings. The subnetworks of one group are a better fit to the scale free 
network model and poorer fits to the small world and core-periphery network models. The 
cores of these same subnetworks also contain a higher percentage of governmental pro-
grams than the information sharing, technical assistance, and coordination and collabora-
tion subnetworks. The same sets of subnetworks show similar patterns for the degree to 
which they fit macrostructural concepts and show similar deviations from the definitions 
when the subnetworks do not fit the definitions exactly, such as in the scale free analysis. 
Each of these results could be interpreted separately and offer different conclusions about 
Table 4
Core-Periphery analysis results
Network
Core-Periphery 
Correlation # Core Members Gov in Core %Gov in Core
Reporting 0.568 30 20 66.7%
Project Coordination 0.610 47 27 57.4%
Information Sharing 0.699 49 23 46.9%
Financial Resource Sharing 0.535 39 23 59.0%
Technical Assistance 0.659 47 25 53.2%
Union 0.700 52 25 48.1%
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the network. The consistency in the patterns of variation, even while that pattern is nu-
anced, is what allows these results to be interpreted as identifying the boundaries between 
the functional subnetworks of a governance network.
Regardless of the amount of latitude organizations have in choosing their own ties 
across all the subnetworks, they will have the least latitude in the reporting subnetwork. 
This is the subnetwork that will be the most affected by mandated relationships, as much 
of the reporting regime exists between legally-defined and established governmental pro-
grams within the nested hierarchies of state and federal government (Osherenko, 2014). 
Further, the core of the financial resource sharing subnetwork is dominated by these same 
government programs, which routinely require evidence of how funds are used by those 
who receive those funds. This requirement links the reporting and financial resource shar-
ing to each other, while also separating them from the sections of the network where 
organizations are freer to act.
The financial resources and reporting subnetworks are the subnetworks through 
which money flows and performance is monitored. Organizations active in this subnet-
work can be expected to be the most effective in implementing policy and completing 
projects as they will have the most resources (Scheinert & Comfort, 2014). The reporting 
and financial resource sharing subnetworks also have the least correlation with information 
sharing, which is the most important subnetwork for supporting the operation of all other 
subnetworks (Kenis & Knoke, 2002). A greater correlation between the financial resource 
sharing and information sharing subnetworks would indicate that organizations are finding 
resources from a greater variety of sources, and so more aggressively matching the funds 
in the network to those who can best use the funds. Improving this connection would effec-
tively increase funding in the system by improving the efficiency by which funds are used.
5. Conclusion
Currently, in the Lake Champlain Basin, internal boundaries within the watershed 
governance network separate the financial resource sharing and reporting subnetworks 
from the information sharing, technical assistance, and collaboration subnetworks. The 
results of this study show that there is some separation of information sharing from the 
governance network’s other subnetworks, a division which could expand or contract over 
time. However, the current data are cross-sectional data, so they cannot provide any guid-
ance on this change. The two sets of subnetworks supported by these data show an internal 
consistency. As discussed above, the combination of the financial resource sharing and 
reporting network takes the form of a semi-official network where formal accountability is 
important. Activities like information sharing and project collaboration, though not with-
out forms of accountability, are typically less hierarchical activities. Nevertheless, access 
points for financial resources are limited and focused on government agencies, which 
demand accountability for the use of their funds. The need for resources to support techni-
cal assistance and collaboration forces actors to work in different parts of the watershed 
governance network.
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Other governance networks may not have this distinction as strongly as the water-
shed governance network in the LCB does. Each governance network must be examined 
individually for its own internal boundaries to be recognized. This research suggests a new 
approach for how this analysis can be done. This research shows that structural analysis of 
the subnetworks of a multiplex network can reveal small but important differences in the 
structures of these networks. These small differences represent important variations that but 
are too small to be reliably recognized by any one network analytic technique, variations 
that change the relationships between functional tie types that researchers apply and the op-
erational pictures that managers face. Instead, triangulation of techniques is required to give 
managers and researchers the information they both need to build situational awareness.
The scale free network analyses do show a different pattern for the financial resource 
sharing subnetwork and the reporting subnetwork. Additionally, where the information shar-
ing, technical assistance, and coordination subnetworks have nearly identically-sized cores, 
the reporting and financial resource sharing subnetworks differ in core size by nearly ten 
organizations. In both cases, the financial resource sharing subnetwork is closer in structure 
to the subnetworks in the other grouping than it is the reporting subnetwork, though the 
financial resource sharing is still more similar to the reporting subnetwork than to the sub-
networks of the other grouping. While the patterns so far discussed are still observed and so 
the boundaries are still supported, this break from consistency limits the certainty of these 
results and suggests that the boundaries may be porous or shifting. Further research using this 
governance network as a case study should either use the two groups that we argue for or use 
three groups, one which includes information sharing, technical assistance, and coordination, 
and then two others that treat reporting and financial resource sharing individually.
Governance networks encode multiple types of interactions and so generate functional 
subnetworks. Few studies to date have made thorough use of multiplex ties, preferring to 
select and analyze only one type of network or another. There is good reason for adhering 
to this limit (Butts, 2008, 2009). Even in exploring the relationship between functional sub-
networks, this study must still adhere to this limit in defining its initial set of subnetworks. 
Adhering to this limit does prevent researchers from examining questions that cross the 
boundaries between types of network interactions. Without a way to explore the boundar-
ies between functional subnetworks, no language can be developed for describing these 
boundaries, testing for their existence, or interpreting their meanings and impacts within a 
given multiplex networks. Being able to address questions about the relationships between 
the functional subnetworks of a governance network will allow researchers to improve our 
understanding of governance networks generally and it will allow managers in governance 
networks to improve their situational awareness and so manage more effectively.
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